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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of an aggressive inflation stabilizing monetary policy on the ability of agents to 
reach a rational expectations equilibrium for inflation and output. Using an adaptive learning framework, we 
develop a model that combines a real wage contracting rigidity with an interest rate rule. We show that an AR(1) 
equilibrium requires more aggressive monetary policy to achieve both determinacy and learnability. This model 
and policy findings contrast with Bullard and Mitra’s [Determinacy, learnability and monetary policy inertia 
(2001); Journal of Monetary Economics49 (2002) 1105] model (no inflation persistence) and policy findings (less 
aggressive policy). These results suggest that aggressive policy is robust in different model specifications. 
• Previous article 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the determinacy and expectational stability condition 1 of the rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) in a simple macroeconomic model.2 These conditions are established using a 
particular monetary policy tack under an interest rate rule––the Taylor rule. In previous work, Bullard and Mitra, 
2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002 evaluate the determinacy and learnability of an REE with alternative policy rules. 
They use a purely forward-looking model of the economy suggested by Woodford (1999, p. 16) and combine 
that model with four information structures of the Taylor rule: (1) contemporaneous data, (2) lagged data, (3) 
forward-looking expectations, and (4) contemporaneous expectations. They find that policy rules which respond 
relatively aggressively to inflation with little or no reaction to the output gap generally induce both determinate 
and learnable REE (Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002). 
 
We extend this line of thought by introducing a relative-real wage contracting model in combination with a 
Taylor rule (Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995, Taylor, 1993, Taylor, 1994, Taylor, 1999).3This model 
contains the characteristic of inflation persistence since agents not only consider a forward-looking component 
of the inflation rate but they also are concerned with the past values of inflation. A number of studies have 
argued that the model without inflation inertia is not realistic (Woodford, 1999). Owyang, 2001, Siklos, 
1999, Granato and Wong, 2002 also show that the inflation rate in the United States is persistent. Ironically, it is 
Woodford who states that “the complete absence of inertial terms in the structural equations is not entirely 
realistic” (Woodford, 1999, p. 13).4 
 
McCallum (2002) also argues that Woodford (1999) model is not robust to the inflation persistence 
situation. McCallum (2002) solves the model of Woodford (1999) with full price flexibility and shows that an 
alternative AR(1) REE of inflation is explosive if Taylor rule is aggressive to the deviations of inflation (McCallum, 
2002, p. 5).5 Comparing with the results suggested in Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002 we show 
that the condition for determinacy and learnability of the AR(1) REE occurs when the policymaker responds 
more aggressively to inflation. This result provides a stronger argument about the overall robustness of 
following an aggressive inflation stabilizing monetary policy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in the next section. Section 3 examines the 
determinacy condition of the model. Section 4 introduces an adaptive learning approach to show the E-stability 
condition. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The model 
The model has three equations: a real wage contracting equation, an IS curve, and a policy rule. Following 
tradition, we assume that agents care about their real wages. However, instead of considering the overlapping 
nominal wage contracts model (Taylor, 1980) which implies a very flexible rate of inflation6 we generalize 
another contracting specification that is based on the recent contributions of Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 
1995: 
 
(1) 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑡𝑡,𝛾𝛾 > 0, 
where πt and yt are inflation rate and output gap respectively, Etπt+1 denotes the expected inflation rate over the 
next period, μ represents the weight of the expected inflation rate on the current inflation, δ is the household’s 
discount factor and 𝑢𝑢1𝑡𝑡 ∼ iid(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢12 ). All variables are expressed in deviations from a steady state.7 
 
Eq. (1) nests the specifications in Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995, Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and 
Mitra, 2002 as special cases. Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995 assume a two-period contract model where 
the market price is expressed as the average of the current and the lagged contract wages. Since agents are 
concerned with their real wages over the lifetime of their contract, they derive the price setting rule of 
Eq. (1) where μ = 1/2. On the other hand, Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002 follow the set up 
in Woodford (1999) and solely rely on the forward-looking component of inflation, Etπt+1. Eq. (1) therefore can 
be reduced to a special case where μ = 1. 
 
Eq. (2) is the “IS” curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer utility maximization (McCallum and 
Nelson, 1999, Woodford, 1999). 
 
(2) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = −𝛽𝛽(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑟∗) + 𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑢2𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽,𝜆𝜆 > 0, 
where rt is nominal interest rate, r* is the target real interest rate and u2t∼iid(0,σu22). 
The policy rule that policymakers follow is the interest rate rule popularized by Taylor, 1993, Taylor, 
1994, Taylor, 1999: 
 
(3) 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋∗) + 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟∗. 
Taylor (1999) argues that his interest rate rule is related to the quantity theory of money. He further asserts that 
his policy rule accurately describes different historical time periods when there were many different policy 
regimes. The Taylor rule has an important attribute in that it provides a basis for determining how aggressively 
policymakers respond to deviations from price and output targets. 
In this vein, Clarida et al. (2000) argue that a non-aggressive monetary policy rule is a policy rule which 
accommodates inflationary pressure by reducing the real interest rate. This reduction of the real interest rate 
creates the self-fulfilling effect on agents’ expectations. It also stimulates an increase in aggregate demand and 
inflation from Eq. (2). On the other hand, Clarida et al. (2000) define an aggressive monetary policy rule as one 
where policymakers raise (lower) the real interest rate when inflationary (deflationary) pressures present 
themselves in the economy. We see that Eq. (3) can be categorized as the aggressive rule if both απ and αy are 
positive (Taylor, 1993, Taylor, 1994). Positive values of απ and αy indicate a willingness to raise (lower) real 
interest in response to the positive (negative) derivations from either target inflation rate (πt − π*) and output 
gap (yt). 
 
To solve the system, we substitute (3) into (2) and solve for πt and yt using the following form: 
 
(4) 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴 + BE𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1 + Cz𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡  
where 
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 ≡ �
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 � ,𝐴𝐴 ≡ 𝑊𝑊 � 0𝜋𝜋∗𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋𝛽𝛽 � ,𝐵𝐵 ≡ 𝑊𝑊 �𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 0𝛽𝛽 𝜆𝜆 � ,𝐶𝐶 ≡ 𝑊𝑊 �1 − 𝜇𝜇 00 0 � ,𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑊𝑊 �𝑢𝑢1𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢2𝑡𝑡 � and 𝑊𝑊
≡ �
1 −𝛾𝛾
𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋) 1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�−1. 
 
3. Determinacy 
We consider whether the REE is unique in this model. We first eliminate the constant term A by taking the 
difference from the mean value of the Eq. (4): 
 
(5) ?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡 = BE𝑡𝑡?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝐶?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡, 
where ?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡 = 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 − ?¯?𝑧 and ?¯?𝑧 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐶𝐶)−1. 
Then we rearrange Eq. (5): 
 
(6�
1 0 −𝐶𝐶110 1 −𝐶𝐶211 0 0 �
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡
?˜?𝑦𝑡𝑡
?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤ = �𝐵𝐵11 𝐵𝐵12 0𝐵𝐵21 𝐵𝐵22 00 0 1 �
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡+1
?˜?𝑦𝑡𝑡+1
?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡+1
𝐿𝐿 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤ + �𝜁𝜁1𝑡𝑡𝜁𝜁2𝑡𝑡0 � − �
𝐵𝐵1
′
𝐵𝐵2
′0 � 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡+1,)  
where 
?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿 ≡ ?˜?𝜋𝑡𝑡−1,𝐶𝐶 ≡ �
𝐶𝐶11 𝐶𝐶12
𝐶𝐶21 𝐶𝐶22� ,𝐵𝐵 ≡ �
𝐵𝐵11 𝐵𝐵12
𝐵𝐵21 𝐵𝐵22� ≡ �
𝐵𝐵1
′
𝐵𝐵2
′ � ,𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡 ≡ �𝜁𝜁1𝑡𝑡𝜁𝜁2𝑡𝑡 � ,𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡+1= ?˜?𝑧𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡+1and𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 ∼ iid�0,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2�. 
 
Taking inverse of the left hand side matrix and multiplying the matrix associated with the one time period 
forward variables gives us: 
 
𝐽𝐽 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0 1
𝛽𝛽
1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦
𝜆𝜆
1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦
−
𝛽𝛽(1+𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋)
1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦
𝜇𝜇�1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽
�1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�(−1+𝜇𝜇) 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆�1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�(−1+𝜇𝜇) −1+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1+𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋)+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�1+𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�(−1+𝜇𝜇) ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤.. 
In Eq. (6), π˜t and y˜t are free endogenous variables whereas π˜tL is a predetermined endogenous variable. It is 
necessary to have exactly two of the eigenvalues of J to be inside the unit circle for uniqueness. We provide the 
condition of determinacy in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
According to the model in Eq.(4)where μ ∈ (0, 1), the necessary and sufficient condition for a unique REE is that 
 
(7) 𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 > 0 
and 
(8) 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 > −1/𝛽𝛽. 
Proof 
We calculate the characteristic polynomial of inverse matrix of J, we have: 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝐿𝐿) = {(𝐿𝐿 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾 + 𝐿𝐿𝜆𝜆 − 1) − (𝐿𝐿2𝜇𝜇 − 1)(𝐿𝐿𝜆𝜆 − 1)𝜇𝜇 − 𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 + 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦[1 − 𝜇𝜇+ 𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 − 1)]}/𝜇𝜇𝜆𝜆𝜇𝜇 
Note that p(1) < 0, p(0) > 0 and p(−1) > 0. By Descartes’ rule of signs (Barbeau, 1989, p. 171), there is necessarily 
a positive root and either two negative roots or a pair of complex conjugates. p(1) < 0 and p(−1) > 0 if (7) is 
satisfied. p(0) > 0 holds by condition (8). □ 
According to the general relative-real wage contracting specification in Eq. (1), a lagged inflation term is included 
in convex combination with the expected inflation term. As μ represents the relative weight between lagged and 
expected inflation, μ → 1 nests the determinacy condition in Bullard and Mitra’s (2002, p. 1115) model. 
 
For the case of μ ∈ (0, 1), Proposition 1 tells us that in an economy with inflation persistence, monetary 
policy must have a larger parameter in hitting inflation targets (or both inflation and output) in order to attain a 
unique REE. This result provides a stronger stability condition than the one in Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard 
and Mitra, 2002. On the other hand, if the lagged inflation component dominates in the model (i.e., μ → 0), the 
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy requires απ > 0. This result implies that monetary policy must 
be aggressive enough in responding to inflation target deviations (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Regions of determinacy and E-stability. 
4. An adaptive learning approach 
Although the REE is determinate, it is also important to see whether agents are able to learn the REE. In this 
section, we analyze the expectational stability (or E-stability) condition in this model (Evans, 1985, Evans and 
Honkapohja, 1995, Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). We assume that agents initially might not be able to 
form rational expectations. Instead, they learn in an adaptive manner and form expectations as new data 
become available over time. We also assume that agents make their forecasts by using recursive least squares. 
Suppose that agents believe that inflation and output gap follow the process (perceived law of motion or PLM):8 
 
(9 ) 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡, 
where at, bt and ct are the coefficients updated by running recursive least squares using actual data (i.e., 
(1, zt−1, ζt)) available over time. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) assume that the current value of the endogenous 
variable zt is not available at the time of expectations formation. This eliminates any simultaneity problem. 
The expected value of zt+1 at time t is: 
(10) 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+1 = (𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−12 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡 . 
Inserting Eq. (10) into Eq. (4), one can solve for the actual law of motion, or ALM, implied by the PLM: 
(11) 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 = (𝐴𝐴 + Ba𝑡𝑡−1 + Bb𝑡𝑡−1𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡−1) + (Bb𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡−1 + (Bb𝑡𝑡−1𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼)𝜁𝜁𝑡𝑡 . 
We define the mapping (T-Mapping) from the PLM to the ALM as: 
(12) 𝑇𝑇�
𝑎𝑎
𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑐 � = �𝐴𝐴 + Ba + BbaBb2 + 𝑐𝑐Bbc + 𝐼𝐼 �. 
We obtain the E-stability conditions by deriving the differential equation from Eq. (12). Using the rules for 
vectorization of matrix products from Magnus and Neudecker (1999, p. 184), we have: 
(13) 
DT𝑎𝑎 �?¯?𝑎,?¯?𝑏� = 𝐵𝐵 �𝐼𝐼 + ?¯?𝑏� ,DT𝑏𝑏 �?¯?𝑏� = ?¯?𝑏′ ⊗ 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐼𝐼 ⊗ 𝐵𝐵?¯?𝑏,DT𝑐𝑐 �?¯?𝑏,?¯?𝑐� = 𝐵𝐵?¯?𝑏.  
Eq. (13) gives us the following result: 
Proposition 2 
An MSV solutiona¯,b¯,c¯to Eq.(4)is E-stable if all eigenvalues of the matrices DTa(a¯,b¯), DT𝑏𝑏(?¯?𝑏), DT𝑐𝑐(?¯?𝑏,?¯?𝑐), given 
by Eq.(13), have real parts less than 1. The solution is not E-stable if any of the eigenvalues has a real part 
greater than 1 (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). 
 
Using baseline parameters suggested by Woodford, 1999, Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002, we 
illustrate our results in Fig. 1.9 We show that the E-stability condition is consistent with the determinacy 
condition (7). Fig. 1 also presents how the value of μ changes both determinacy and E-stability condition 
numerically. 
 
There are three cases: (1) Bullard and Mitra’s model (μ → 1), (2) Fuhrer and Moore’s model (μ = 1/2), and (3) a 
case without forward looking component (μ → 0). Fig. 1 plots the regions of determinacy and expectation 
stability as a function of απ and αy in above cases. In the region where απ > 0, the rational expectational 
equilibrium is determinate and E-stable in all cases. However, the region of indeterminacy and E-unstability in 
Fuhrer and Moore’s specification (μ = 1/2) is larger than that in Bullard and Mitra’s setup without the 
component of inflation persistence (μ → 1). This result suggests that if inflation persistence exists in an 
economy, policymakers should impose larger inflation and output gap parameters in the policy rule such that 
the REE can be determinate and learnable. Moreover, if inflation in an economy is solely affected by the lagged 
inflation (μ → 0), policymakers must be aggressive in attaining their inflation target to satisfy the determinacy 
and learnability condition. These results indicate there is a much broader and robust implication from an 
aggressive, inflation stabilizing monetary policy. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper extends the study of Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002 on determinacy and 
learnability of an REE when policymakers follow a Taylor interest rate policy rule. Instead of following a purely 
forward-looking model suggested by Woodford (1999), we modify a real wage contract model by Fuhrer, 
1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995 along with a contemporaneous Taylor rule. The real wagecontract model 
contains the characteristic of inflation persistence since agents concern themselves with both past 
and future inflation rates. Based on this model, we find a stronger, more robust result about aggressive, inflation 
stabilizing monetary policy than the one given by Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002. We show 
that if inflation is more persistent in an economy, the policy rule should have larger value of parameters on 
inflation and output derivations so that the AR(1) rational expectation equilibrium is determinate and learnable. 
If inflation is extremely persistent in an economy, the policy rule should respond aggressively to deviations from 
their inflation target for determinacy and learnability. Our finding has important implications for policy since it 
focuses exclusive attention on inflation stabilization. Policymakers who respond aggressively to deviations from 
their inflation target will be more successful in stabilizing business cycle fluctuations. 
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Notes 
1 See Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
2 We use the terms “expectational stability,” “E-stability,” and “learnability” interchangeably in this paper. 
3 In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of a policy rule with contemporaneous data only (Taylor, 1993, 
Taylor, 1994, Taylor, 1999). There are number of studies that investigate this monetary policy rule and 
treat this specification as standard in the literature (see also Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999, Fuhrer and 
Moore, 1995, Bullard and Mitra, 2001, Bullard and Mitra, 2002, Taylor, 1993, Taylor, 1994, Taylor, 1999, 
Woodford, 1999). Taylor argues that this policy rule is derived from the quantity theory of money. He 
points out that it describes different historical time periods in the United States. 
4 We would like to thank the referee for suggesting this reference and also in pointing out this argument. 
5 McCallum (2002) shows that only the minimum state variable (MSV) solution is stationary under the set up of 
Woodford (1999) with full price flexibility. He then considers the other candidate solution, an AR(1) REE, 
and shows that the solution is explosive if the coefficient of inflation in the Taylor rule is positive. 
6 See Fuhrer (1995) for details. 
7 Fuhrer, 1995, Fuhrer and Moore, 1995 do not set up their model as the deviation from a steady state. 
However, the model can be derived in that form without changing the equations being considered here. 
8 In this model, we mainly focus on the minimal state variable (MSV) solutions (McCallum, 1983). 
9 According to Woodford, 1999, Bullard and Mitra, 2002, γ = 0.024, β = 6.37, and λ = 1. 
